PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY

DECISIONS SELECTED

FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.

ADMIRAI4 TY.
Judge Thomas, of the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, recently handed down a very interesting
Jarisdiction,
Mace of
Injury,
Action for
Negligence

It is not
The Sra~o, 90 Fed. I io.
often that a jurisdictional question arises now, as
the limits of the admiralty jurisdiction are so
well settled. In the present case a workman on
a vessel lying at a dock fell from a
ladder, which
opinion:

was not properly secured to the ship's rail, owing to the
master's negligence, and struck on the dock. The claimant
-excepted to the court's jurisdiction on the ground that the
injury was received on land. The court grouped the cases
into two classes-the first, where the primal cause arises on
the ship and is communicated to property on the land, the
-court of admiralty having no jurisdiction; and the second,
where the conditions are just reversed and the jurisdiction of
the court is conceded. The learned judge observed that the
cases usually showed a negligent act or omission arising in
one locality, and communicated to the libellant or his property in another, and did not think they had intended to decide
that the injury must be completed on the water to give jurisdiction, irrespective of the locality where the breach of duty
first operated upon the person injured. "The more consistent
rule," said the court, "seems to be that a court of admiralty
has jurisdiction when the negligent act or omission, wherever
done or suffered, takes effect and produces injury to the person
-or property of another on navigable waters. In that case it
would be unimportant where the breach of duty occurred, or
where the physical injury was completed."
The admirable
reasoning of the court very ably supports its conclusions, and,
as they do not conflict with the cases of The Plymouth, 3
Wall. 20; Johnson v. Elevator Co., 1 19 U. S. 388; P., TV. &
B. R. R. Co. v. P. & H. de G. St. Towboat Co., 23 How. 209,
and other decisions known as "mixed cases," this opinion
may be regarded as a distinct contribution to the subject.
107
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One of the results directly contemplated by Congress in the
passage of the Harter Act was reached by Brown, J., in the
The'
case of The British King, 89 Fed. 872.
HatterAs4,
Leak,
court held that the vessel was not liable for the
Sounding negligence of her officers in failing to take soundings and apply the pumps,, although it was known that there
was a leak likely to cause damage to the cargo.
The decision in the case of Car Float No. 4, 89 Fed. 877,
should be called to the attention of the owners of all such
Lines floats. It imposes the duty of providing spare
spare L
lines to secure them against any possible breaking
away from their moorings. The court said: "The mere fact
that similar floats have not been in the habit of carrying any'
spare lines cannot be admitted as a .defence, or as dispensing
with the requirements of reasonable prudence so long understood and recognized in navigation."
ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS.

Assuming that the law of a given jurisdiction permits preferences in assignments for creditors, such preferences are still
Preferences subject to attack precisely as if they had been
given in the form of mortgages or judgments,
prior to the assignments. So, in Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Scott
& Co., 55 Pac. (Utah) 8 I, such a preference was assailed on
the ground that it secured the debt of a stockholder and
officer of the company assigning; but, it appearing that the
debt was really the company's, the officer merely signing the
note for its accommodation, the preference was sustained.
Clark v. Richards Lumber Co., 77 N. W. (Minn.) 213, defines the extent of the authority of an assignee for the benefit
Rights of of creditors. Shortly after such assignment by
Assignees the lumber company, Clark claimed the ownership of a large amount of lumber, which wag also claimed by
the assignee; pending litigation, it was agreed that it should
be sold and the proceeds treated as the original property.
After final decision in Clark's favor it is now held that he is
entitled to the whole fund, and that the assignee may not
deduct therefrom his share as creditor of the company, of the
expenses of administration. Hooven v. Burdette, 39 N. E.
1107, was distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff
there had agreed that the disputed property should remain in
assignee's hands.
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BANIKRUPTCY.

The National Bankrupt Law of July 1, i898, while it provides that it shall go into full force and effect upon its passage,
BankruptAct,

nevertheless prohibits the filing of petitions for

Time af aoln involuntary bankruptcy within four months. In
latOa Blake v. Francis-Vlentine Co., 89 Fed. 691, the
company on August 3, 1898, had, while insolvent, permitted its property to be attached by one of its creditors;
upon bill filed by one of the creditors to restrain a sale by the
sheriff, it was held (I) that the relation of debtor and creditor
was to be governed by the act from the date of its passage,
and (2) that the general powers of the Court of Bankruptcy
were sufficiently broad to protect this property, even though
no bankruptcy suit was, or could be, pending in the court at
that time.
General orders in bankruptcy have, in accordance with
Orders and the provisions of the act, been published by the
Forms
Supreme Court, 89 Fed. 769. The "Forms" mentioned in Order 38 are promised for January, 1899.
CARRIRS.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has decided that notice
by printing a condition on the face of a ticket, e. g., "Good
for one continuous passage, beginning on day of
AddiU.,i
sale only," with the date stamped on the back,
Ticiets,
sufficient together with placards posted up in the stations
Notce
and elsewhere to the effect that " local tickets"
would be subject to the before-mentioned condition, is not
sufficient where the passenger paid the usual fare: Louisville
& N. R. v. Turner,4 7 S. W. 223.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

That provision of the War Revenue Act laying an excise
tax on board'of trade sales was sustained by Showalter, Cir.
War Revenue J., in Nicol v. Ames (Northern District of Illinois),
Act of ,893, 89 Fed. 144. The provision in question, found in
Excise on paragraph 2 of Schedule A of the act, reads:
Board of
Trade sales,

"Upon each sale, agreement of sale, or agreement
Uniformity to sell, any products or merchandise at any exchange, or board of trade, or other similar place, either for
present or future delivery, for each one hundred dollars . . .
one cent; provided that on every sale . . . there shall be
made and delivered by the seller to the buyer a bill, memorandum, agreement or other evidence, . .. which shall
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have upon it in stamps the amount of the tax." On habeas
corpus by Nicol, a member of the Chicago Board of Trade,
imprisoned for failure to comply with the act, it was contended that the provision requiring a written memorandum
was in excess of Congressional power, as invalidating an oral
Intrastate contract made in the course of intrastate, as disContract
tinguished from interstate, commerce.
But the
judge, points out that the law does not make the oral contract void; it simply provides a penalty for the absence of a
document, leaving untouched the obligation of the contract.
There was a further objection, that the tax, being on documents used in certain transactions only, violates the rule of
uniformity laid down in Article i, Section 8, of the United
States Constitution. But the court considered that the tax
is really on the transaction, not on the documents which evidence the transaction. The documents were held, quoting
Marshall's historic language in MfcCullough v. Maryland, to
be merely means appropriate to the end of taxation.
A Wisconsin law (L. 1897, c. 334, § 3), providing that
whenever the property of a debtor is levied on or attached
Impairment by any process, the debtor may, within ten days,
make an assignment for the benefit of his creditof the
Obligation of ors, which shall dissolve absolutely the levy or
attachment, was pronounced unconstitutional as
Contracts
to prior debts: Peninsular Lead & Color Works v. Union D.
& P. Co. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin), 76 N. W. 359, following Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31.
Cassoday, C.J., dissenting, said: "To my mind the obligations of the contract were not impaired by the mere modification of the statutory remedy, so far as to dissolve the attachment, if made within ten days prior to the debtor's assignment." The learned justice had dissented in the former case
also.
CONTRACTS.

A very interesting case as to the granting of injunctions in
cases of contracts for personal service, in restraint of trade, is
Contract for William Robinson & Co., Limited,v. Heuer [1898],
In this case, by an agreement in
Personal
2 Ch. 451.
Services,

Restraint of

writing, H. agreed to serve the plaintiff company

as confidential clerk for a term of five years, the
Trade,
Injunction company having the option to renew the engagement for five years more. The company could dismiss H. at
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any time by three months' notice. H. agreed that during
the term he would devote his whole time and attention to the
business of the company, and that he would not during the
engagement, without the consent of the company, engage as
principal or servant in any other business upon pain of dismissal. H. further- agreed that if he should be so dismissed
he would not at any time within three years from his dismissal be engaged as principal, agent or servant in the business of dealer of wares of the description made by the company within 150 miles of W. In 1898 H. left the service of
the company without leave and became traveller to another
firm carrying on the same business, and the company applied
for an injunction to restrain him during the term of service
from engaging in this employment. Held, that, during the
continuance of the engagement, the agreement made by H.
that he would not engage, in any business relating to goods
sold by the plaintiff, was valid, though not restricted in point
of space, and that it was severable from the agreement not to
engage in any other business, and should be enforced by injunction. The injunction was therefore granted, but limited
to the first term of five years, the plaintiff waiving his option
to retain H. in his service for another five years, and the court
doubting whether the agreement for that term ought to be
enforced.

CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Arizona has lately been called upon
to protect minority stockholders against a majority who, with
the corporate officers, were controlling the corporation's business in the interest of a rival concern
Minority
Stockholders with which the officers and the majority were conby Malority, nected. The corporation was one formed to build
Msoluder a canal and deliver water to the stockholders. The
complainants united in their bill prayers for relief, based upon
their rights as stockholders, with others based upon their rights
as original appropriators of water. The court below of its own
motion dismissed the bill for this misjoinder; but on appeal
the court leniently permitted an amendment and the filing of a
supplemental bill inasmuch as the complainants, if driven to
new suits, would have found themselves barred by the statute
of limitations; Henshaw v. Salt River Val. Canal Co., 54 Pac.
577.
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It should seem that the distinction is clear between the
liability of the stockholder for unpaid balances on his stock
and his statutory liability to contribute to pay the
Statutory
Liability of corporation's debts. In the one case the liability
Stockholders is an asset of the corporation which a creditor can
for Corporate enforce only in equity and upon the theory that
Debts
his suit is a garnishment proceeding. In the
other case, the right against the stockholder runs directly to
the creditor and may be enforced by him in an action which
is, in substance, an action against a guarantor or surety. The
distinction is not affected by the fact that the fruits of the
action to enforce the statutory liability belong to all creditors
ratably, nor by the circumstance that all stockholders within
the jurisdiction must be made parties defendant.
Their
liability is several in substance, though joint in form. Those
not joined, are not released by a judgment against the rest.
Therefore, those not joined, should not, in a subsequent proceeding, be concluded by the judgment previously rendered
against their fellows. Yet, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
in Hanson v. Davison, 76 N. W. 254, while admitting that a
stockholder, not a party to the original action to enforce the
statutory liability, is not released by the judgment rendered
therein, has declared that he is concluded by it as respects the
existence and amount of corporate debts. The dissent of
Canty, J., points out the inconsistency.
The New Jersey Court of Chancery, in Tennant v.Appleby,
41 Ati. IIo,permits itself to speak of the "rule in equity"
that the directors of a corporation upon its insolInsolvent
Corporations, vency become trustees for its creditors, citing
Preference of Montgomery v. Phillips, 53 N. J. Eq. 203, and
Directors Savage v. Miller, 39 Atl. 665. The former
was a case of fraudulent preference. The latter was a case
in which the court permitted a preference in favor of creditors related to directors by " consanguinity, affection and
professional relationship." There was, indeed, some ground
for treating the preference of the director-creditor in Tennant
v. Appleby as tainted with fraud; but the court preferred to
base its decision on the so-called "rule " as above stated.
This is unfortunate, for nobody has ever yet succeeded in
working out a consistent and tenable theory of trusteeship for
creditors, and it is safe to say that nobody can. Directors are
not trustees of the corporate property for creditors either
before or after insolvency. This is evident from the fact that
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they do not hold the legal title to the property .of the corporation:-and no one ever heard of a trustee'without a legal title.
Sir George Jessel expressed his opinion of the so-called
" rule" in Zn re Winchtn Shipbuilding Co., 9 Ch. Div. 322.
Nor will it do to say that they are trustees, "metaphorically
speaking." Mr. Justice Brewer assigns a suitable place to
metaphor in the statement of a legal doctrine in Hollins v.
Brierfed Co., I5O U. S. 371. Preferences ought, perhaps, to
be made void by statute in the case of individuals and of corporations too--except where the facts are like those in Sanford
Tool Co. v. Howe, Brown & Co., 157 U. S. 312. Corporate
preferences were forbidden by statute in New Jersey prior to
1875 and since 1895. But unless some such statutes are
passed, it is idle to attempt to invalidate bona fide preferences
of corporate creditors, whether the creditors happen to be
stockholders, directors or strangers. In the case of the
stockholder-creditor, indeed, there is room for an argument
against the preference on the partnership principle that a partner cannot compete with creditors in the distribution of the
firm estate. This thought has not, so far as the writer knows,
been developed by any court.
CRMINWAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Wi v. Jordan,
41 Atl. 233, decided that the statements of confessed prinArrest *n
cipals in a felony, that another was also concerned,
Suspicion
are not of themselves sufficient to justify a constable in arresting that other on the ground of suspicion.

ELECTIONS.
Where a contention arises between two conventions of the
same political party as to which is entitled to have the ticket
Pty
r
nominated by it placed upon the official ballot
cooventions, under the recognized party name, held, that that
Ballots
convention is entitled which has been called by
the regular state central committee of the party: Wiliams v.
Lewis (Supreme Court of Idaho), 54 Pac. 619.

EVIDENCE.

State v. Burlingame, 48 S. W. (Mo.) 72, an illustration of a
type of criminal cases which is becoming too familiar, con-
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Insolvent

tains several interesting rulings: (I) That in a

PRelvlng

trial upon the charge of receiving deposits while
the bank was insolvent, acquittal on a similar

Knowledge of

charge for receiving a subsequent deposit is no de-

Banks,.
Deposits with

Insolvency

fence; (2) evidence of a financial panic at the time

are properly excluded, as, if proved, it would be no excuse
for the commission of the offence; (3) evidence as to the receipt of. other deposits was immaterial, and should not have
been received even for the purpose of showing knowledge by
the defendant that the bank was receiving deposits.
In Long v. State (Criminal Court of Appeals, Texas), 47
S. W. 363, the defendant was accused of burglary, and eviSimilarbut dence of his participation in another precisely
Disconnected similar burglary was held inadmissible, although
Offences

it corroborated the testimony of an accomplice.

The mere fact that the two offences are precisely similar do
not make them parts of a system or comprehensive scheme
of crime so as to render the one evidence of the other, nor
will evidence inadmissible per se be admitted, because of its
tendency to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice.
This is a striking instance of the rule that mere similarity
cannot render the fact of commission of one crime admissible
to prove the commission of another, nor will the greatest similarity in details, without more, render the one evidence of a
general system of crime, in the execution of which the other
was committed. The similar offence must clearly show some
general comprehensive scheme of crime, in the execution of
which each separate offence became necessary, as in the Molly
Maguire cases in Pennsylvania. See Com. v. Carroll, 84
Pa. 107.
GUARANTY.

In Fulton Grain Swill Co. v. Anglim, 54 N. Y. Suppl. 32, it
was properly held that a guarantor of the price of goods sold
Defedcsby

and delivered could not defend on the ground

Guarantor that the purchaser had in turn sold them to
others than those he had agreed to sell them to. Failure of
consideration as between principal and guarantor is a matter
of no moment to the creditor.
Of a different character was the defence in United States to
use v. American Bonding and Trust Co., 89 Fed. 92!. Here
the defendant became surety for Minor & Bro., upon the

assurance, inter alia, by the use plaintiff that Minor & Bro.
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were under no liability, whereas at that very time they were
indebted to the plaintiff for a considerable sum. Of course,
the defendant was discharged from liability. Contrasting it
with the previous case, it is obvious that, whether one calls it
lack of consideration, misrepresentation or fraud, we have
here a positive piece of misconduct by the creditor himself for
which he should be held responsible. Besides, the receipt by
the creditor of the principal's note would in itself have discharged the surety: Rees v. Barringon, 2 Ves. Jr. 540.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

Of interest at this time is the decision of the District Court,
N. D. of California, in In re Perrone.89 Fed. 150, where construing § 117, Rev. St., requiring the consent of
Army,
Enlistmentof the parents or guardians of a minor to his enlistfinor, Right

ment in the military service of the United States,
"provided that such minor has such parents or guardian entitled to his custody and control," the court holds that it does
not authorize a court to discharge from such service a minor
whose parents are non-resident aliens, and who at the date of
his enlistment had no guardian, -on the application of a guardian since appointed.
toDicharge

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Jones v: Gutman, 41 AtI. (Md.) 192, is an illustration of the
constantly recurring question as to the wife's agency to represent her husband and purchase on his credit.
wife's
Debenham v. Mellon, 6 App. Cas. 24, has gone a
Agencyto
Bind Husband

long way to clear up the law by deciding that

marriage itself creates no agency, and if the husband is to be
held, an authority to the wife, express or implied, must be
proved. For failing to recognize this principle, the judgment
of the lower court was reversed.
.MWlIs v. AMil1s [1898], 2 Ch. 504, is an unusual case. On
March 15, 1879, a man and woman executed a
Marriage,
Ante-nuptial

marriage settlement, containing a covenant to

settlements settle certain after-acquired property on the wife.
On May 7, 1879, another settlement was made, also containing an after-acquired property clause more liberal to the wife.
Upon petition filed by wife against her husband's executors,
she claiming under the second settlement, it was held that,
though the first settlement might have been varied by the
parties, yet, in the absence of all evidence as to why it had
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been executed, the second settlement, in so far as it contradicted the first, was not a revocation of it.
A rather unexpected construction was put by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Rockwell v. Waverly Traction, 41
Separatesuts At. 324, upon the Act of May 8, 1895, P.
for ijuries L. 54.
For an accident happening after that
to Wife
date to a wife, her husband and herself brought
separate suits; upon the trial of her suit, he asked to be made
a party-a request which upon defendant's objection was
refused by the court. In spite of the apparently mandatory
provisions of the Act that the suit shall be joint, it was held
that plaintiffs could recover.

INSOLVENCY.

The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the wholesome

modem rule that while an insolvent corporation may, unless
forbidden by statute, prefer an ordinary creditor
Insolvent
Corporations, by judgment or otherwise, yet such preference
Preference cannot be given to one of its own directors. It
was held, in Rockford Grocery Co. v. StandardGrocery Co.,
51 N. E. (IIl.) 642, that this rule does not invalidate a preference given to a creditor whose debt was guaranteed by a director, the right of the bonaJUe creditor being emphasized by
the court.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.

An interesting case on the question of privileged communications was Trebb v. TranscriptPub. Co., 76 N. W. 96x. In
Resolution of this case a city council passed a resolution in
city councal, which they characterized the plaintiff as a disrepPrivileged utable person; that he maliciously and knowCommunica. ingly published in a newspaper a false report of a
certain suit in which the city had been interested,
and they condemned his conduct as -execrable and odious,
and as having caused the city irreparable damage. The defendant published this resolution in its newspaper, and the
plaintiff sued it for libel. Held, that it was libelous per se;
that councils have no more right to traduce a man's private
character than any other body of private citizens; that the
resolution was outside of the duty of councils, and the fact
that it was published in good faith as a matter of news would
not excuse the defendant.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

The so-called "carriage cases," Laugher v. Pointer,5 B. & C.
547, and Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499, receive an interesting addition in Jonesv. Scullard [ 1898], 2 Q.
What
Constitutes B. 565. An accident occurred on the day of the
the

Relatiomsip

Queen's jubilee, by the hired driver of defendant's

brougham, with defendant inside, negligently losing control
of defendant's horse. The brougham and horse were kept at
a livery stable, whose owner, as in this instance, provided the
driver. It was held by Russell, C. J., that there was evidence
from which a jury might find that the driver was at the
moment acting as servant of the defendant. And this would
seem to be the sensible solution of the difficulty, rather than
attempting to lay down as matters of law that certain varying
facts do or do not constitute the relation of master and servant.
It is hardly necessary at the present day to cite authorities
to show that a servant engaged for a term renders himself
liable to discharge before the expiration of the
Dischare,
Disobefience

term by disobedience to orders.

Gallagher v.

Wayne Steam Co., 41 Atl. (Pa.) 294, is the most recent case
of the kind.
MORTGAGES.

The claim of the holder of a chattel mortgage, given as
security for the payment of purchase money, may be defeated
by the mortgagor's proving a breach of warranty
Chattel
Mortgage, which damaged the mortgagor to a greater extent
Breach of
warranty than the unpaid purchase money: Hennessey v.

Barnett, 55 Pac. (Colo.) 197.

American Baptist Union v. Weeks, 77 N. W. (Minn.) 36,
reversing same case, 7 5 N. W. 713, presents a great variety of
Paymentot judicial opinion on the subject of the duty of a
junior mortgagee. W, as second mortgagee, in
Taxesby
Junior
mortgagee order to save the property, paid the taxes for
1889, taking an assignment certificate; subsequently he
obtained both by foreclosure, subject to plaintiff's mortgage.
In 1895 plaintiff foreclosed, and had to pay delinquent taxes
of 1893-4. In 1896 plaintiff, under protest, redeemed from
sale for 1889 taxes and sued Weeks for reimbursement; he
proved that he had paid out more than he had received during
his occupation. Upon the first argument judgment for plaintiff
was affirmed on the theory that he stood in the shoes of the
original mortgagor, having taken an assignment of mortgage
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from him; and, further, that though he had originally the
right to reimbursement, he lost it by his failure to pay the
taxes of 1894-5.
Start, C. J., and Buck, J., dissented on the ground that,
though he did not have to pay the taxes of 1889, yet the payment enured to the protection of the first mortgagee, who, if
he wants the benefit of it, must pay for it. This is practically
the view now adopted by the court, per Mitchell, J., who held
that W had no duty to pay these taxes, and as owner in possession had performed his obligation. Canty, J., while agreeing that the former opinion was wrong, dissents on the ground
that the second. mortgagee has the same duties as the original
owner.
The latter opinion is cited with approval in Dare/insv.Davis,
77 N. W. (Minn.) 214, holding that, as there is no duty on
the second mortgagee to pay the interest on the first mortgage, he may as creditor redeem the land from purchaser at
sheriff's sale undei first mortgage; also that a foreclosure for
one installment of the mortgage debt exhausts the lien of the
mortgage.
A calf is a curious kind of after-acquired property; yet in
Bank v. Baker, 41 Atl. (N. J.) 704, it was held, on the faith of
the maxim partus sequitur ventrem, that a chattel
Increa".
Chattel
mortgage of a cow, as against subsequent mortMortgage
gagees, covered her after-born calf, even though
not mentioned in the mortgage. It was intimated by the
court that the mortgagee's title would not have prevailed as
against a bona fide purchaser for value.
The cases are numerous which discuss under what circumstances a trustee of real estate has power to mortgage it,
though it is really in each case simply a question of
Power of
Trustees to the construction of the language of the will. In
Mortgage Dure/l v. Be/linger [1898], 2 Ch- 534, a general
power of sale or postponement, and to make outlays from
income or capital for improvements, repairs, etc., was held to
confer, by implication, a power to mortgage for the purposes
for which outlays were authorized.
B, holding a mortgage on A's land, which had been subsequently, without B's knowledge, conveyed to C, delivered to
satifaction, C who was his financial agent, a satisfaction of
Mistake In the mortgage, to be filed when the mortgage was
Filing
paid off. C, through inadvertence, filed it of
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record and subsequently made assignment for creditors to D.
Up6n bill by B's executors to have satisfaction cancelled, D
defended on ground that rights of C's creditors would be thus
impaired. There was a decree for plaintiff, there being no
equitable estoppel because it was not proved that C's creditors
knew of or suffered by the satisfaction: Wilson v. Kelly, 76
N. W. (Minn.) 258.
The question involved in Bislop v. Kent & Stanley Co., 41
AUt. (N. J.) 255, was the validity of a corporate mortgage,
Vallty o which had been executed without the consent of
irregular the 75 per cent. of the stockholders required by
Corporation charter. It does not appear that the holder of
MortgZae the mortgage had any knowledge of this defect;
and if so, in accordance with the weight of authority (see
Bank v. Turquand, 5 E. & B. 248, 6 E. & B. 327; Webb v.
Commissioners, L. R. 5 Q. B. 642; Hackensack Co. v. DeKay,
36 N. J. Eq. 548), he is not bound to investigate the indoor
management of the company, and may assume that the requirements of the charter have been complied with. For
some reason, not apparent, the court did not place its decision
on this ground, but held that, as the provision was intended
only for the benefit of stockholders, the mortgage was not
void, but voidable by them. It followed that, as they had
not attacked it, but on the contrary had acquiesced in it by
allowing the payment of interest upon it, the unsecured corporate creditors could not attack it.
NEGLIGENCE.

The Court of Appeals of Colorado, in Walters v. Denver
Consol. Electric Light Co., 54 Pac. 96o, decided that a mother
Electricity, who voluntarily takes hold of her child in an
Exposed Wire endeavor to remove him from contact with a live
Within Reach electric wire is not negligent, whether she is
of Child,
Attempt at

aware of the danger or not, and that she can
recover from the company for her injuries if the
latter has been negligent. In this case, which was an action
by a boy and his mother, a naked wire was placed on a house
near a window and within reach of it. The room in which the
window was placed was occupied by a child of twelve years.
The insulator became detached from the wire and the boy
Held,
attempted to replace it, whereby he was injured.
whether putting an exposed live wire in such a place was
negligence was for the jury, and that whether the boy was
Rescue
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negligent in taking hold of it was also for the jury. Held,
also, that the mother in taking hold of him, whereby she also
was injured, was not negligence, the court saying: "To say.
that an act to which her affection irresistibly impelled her
should be charged against her as something imprudent and
unnecessary would be to shock a sentiment which is as universal as mankind."
PARENT AND CHILD.

The fallacy of the rule which imputes the negligence of a
father or attendant to an infant of tender years is demonContributory
Negligence o

Parents,
ChTdre aof

strated in a singularly well-reasoned opinion of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in the case of
Ry. Co. v. Herrklotz, 47 S. W. 265, where the

child injured was under four years of age, and
where they refused to allow the doctrine of imputed negligence to be imported into the case, holding that
the right of the infant to recover damages for an injury was
as much his own as an estate conferred by a gift, and a third
person's wrong or delinquency should not be allowed to affect
one any more than the other.
Tender Yanjrereassn

PARTNERSHIP.

In Hoopes v. Hartwell (Colorado Court of Appeals), 54 Pac.
64, the plaintiffs sued B, C and D, as partners, for goods sold
and delivered. It appeared that the plaintiffs had
Notice of
Dissolution, made a number of sales to the defendants at a
Rigts of
time when they were doing business under a firm
Creditors name; but the goods, for the price of which the
suit was brought, were sent to a new branch establishment at
a different town, and the plaintiffs were directed to bill goods
so sent to B alone. The question was whether B alone was
liable or whether the debt in suit was a partnership debt. On
such an issue it seems clear that the plaintiffs should have
been given an opportunity to prove admissions by C and D
that the branch establishment was a firm enterprise and that
their only desire was to keep the accounts separate. Evidence of such an admission was, however, excluded by the
trial judge, as was also the testimony of one familiar with
the creditors' business, as to who was understood to be the
purchaser of the goods and on what credit they were delivered. Moreover, the trial judge, in charging the jury that
all the defendants were liable for the debt unless they had
notified the plaintiffs of a dissolution of the firm, qualified his
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charge that this was true unless the plaintiffs had waived their
rights against the defendants. The judgmeni was reversed
for the improper exclusion of evidence, and also on the
ground that the jury was very probably misled by the use of
the word "waiver" in a case in which the right of the plaintiffs could have been extinguished only by a release. The
court has done a service to legal progress in insisting upon
an accurate use of legal terminology. The term, "waiver,"
is almost as much abused as "estoppel" and "trust."
A and B, partners, made a general assignment of firm and
separate estate for the benefit of creditors. The firm estate
Marshaling,
Joint and

Separate

Creditors

was exhausted before the firm debts were paid,

and certain firm creditors, who had not yet reduced their claims to judgment, obtained nothing.
The assignee was discharged; B acquired real

estate and died, leaving separate debts, incurred subsequent
to the assignment, which exceeded the amount of the property so acquired. The question was whether unpaid firm
creditors should be excluded from competing with the separate creditors in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of
the real estate. The surrogate properly applied the principle
that there can be no marshaling in favor of the separate creditors in a case where there are not two funds. In other
words, on such a state of facts, no good reason could be assigned for exercising equitable control of the firm creditor's
legal right to satisfaction out of the separate estate of the individual -partners: In re Striker: In re Ives's Estate, 53 N. Y.
Suppl. 732.
In Wet! v. Jaeger, 51 N. E. 196, a banking business was
carried on by six partners.
A made deposits with them.
Subsequently four sold out to two. the two exesale of
Business by cuting the usual bond of indemnity to the four.
Firm to
On the entity theory, this was obviously a sale by
Single
the firm to the remaining partners. The two then
Partners,
Rights
continued in business and A continued his deCreditors posit account (which at that date amounted to
about fourteen hundred dollars), and afterwards deposited a
little less than five hundred dollars more. The two then
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and in their
schedule of liabilities they put down A's entire deposit as a
claim against them. A filed his claim for this amount with
the assignee and afterwards brought suit against the six and
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recovered judgment. Upon these facts it seems sufficiently
clear that A was a separate creditor of the two, and not their
partnership creditor, as respects the amount of his claim
against the old firm. It seems equally clear that he was a
partnership creditor of the two as to the amount of his deposit
subsequent to the original dissolution. As to the former
sum, he should have been permitted to prove with the separate creditors of the two. As to the latter sum, he should.
have been permitted to prove with their partnership creditors.
For reasons which are not satisfactorily stated, the court permitted A to prove for his whole claim with the firm creditors
of the two. It is, however, noted in the report that a re-hearing is pending.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

Two decisions upon the removal of causes from a state
court by Simonton, Cir. J., in the Circuit Court of the United
Removal of States for the Western District of North Carolina,
Caus- for
PreudLocal

appeared in the same publication on December 27,
last: (I) Under the Acts of 1887-88

(March 3,
1887, re-enacted August 13, 1888, 25 Stat., c.
Limit of Time 866, 433, 435), prejudice or local influence must
be shown to the" legal satisfaction" of the Circuit Court. The
amount and manner of the proof required in each case must
be left to the discretion of the court; (2) after the term has
expired, at which an order 'for removal on such ground was
made, it cannot be reviewed; (3) such a proceeding may be
ex parte without notice of the application to the adverse party:
Crotts v. Southern Ry. Co., 90 Fed. I. As to 2 see, also, Par'ks
v. Ry. Co., Ibid, 3.
Influence,

The Circuit Court of the United States for the Eighth Circuit has recently stated the familiar rule that if, in an action
Contributory for personal injury, the undisputed facts establish
Negligence, the existence of contributory negligence on the
Binding
part of the plaintiff, it is the duty of the trial
Instruction court to instruct the jury to find for the defendant.
The only question, in the Appellate Court, is whether the
trial court ruled rightly in holding that the defence of contributory negligence was conclusively proven by the evidence
in the case: Claus v. Steamship Co., 89 Fed. 646.
The test of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in a suit
to enjoin the further infringement of a trade-mark and for an
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Jursdicton, accounting, is the value of the trade-mark to be
FederalCourt, protected, and not the amount of damages which
Trademark may have been sustained, as decided by the United

States Circuit Court, Northern District of California: Hennessy v. Hermann, 89 Fed. 669.
It is often interesting to study questions of pleading and
practice that differ from any that could arise in one's own state.
,Code Pleading, The following syllabus is from a case in the
'Non est Supreme Court of Tennessee: Bill in Chancery
Factu-n" to
Promissory

upon a Note.-Defence was a plea by defendant

of " non est factum," in the code form
"the note was not executed by him, or by any
one authorized to bind him." Under direction of the court,
issues were made as to whether defendant signed the note him-self or authorized it to be signed. Held, that the issues were
not equivalent to the plea, since a party by ratification might
be held to have executed the instrument which he never signed
or authorized to be signed, and estoppel would have prevented
his denying it to be his own, though, in fact, it were not:
Furnist v. Burge, 47 S.W. l095.
Note, Issue
Thereon

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

The importance of care in the preparation of a power of
attorney is well shown in Tyrrell v. O'Connor, 41 Atl. (N. J.)
Construction 674, where it was held that a power to sell bonds
of Powerof did not of itself include the power to bind his
Attorney principal to convey. The difficulty was, how-ever, cured by the ratification clause of the power, which expressly mentioned sales.
Although the act of an agent be beyond the authority conferred by his principal, yet the principal, by ratifying his act,
Rattifcation either expressly or impliedly, becomes responsible
for it. See Laudin v. Moorhead Bank, 77 N. W.
(Minn.) 35, where bank was held liable for the proceeds of
the sale of plaintifi's wheat, unlawfully sold by its cashierthe bank having received the proceeds.
It is well settled that A, an undisclosed principal, cannot
recover from B, the third party, the price of goods sold to B
Undisclosed

by C, A's agent, if B, not knowing that C was

Principal acting for A, has in the meantime paid C. A forliori, if C was not A's agent at all, but simply employs A to
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fulfill his (C's) contract with B, A has no action against,
because no contract with, B: Carroll v. Benedictne Society,
41 At. (Md.) 784REAL PROPERTY.

In Waterworks Co. v. Ry. Co., 54 Pac. (Mont.) 963, occurs
an exhaustive discussion of the distinction between an easeEasement,
Licnse,
Distinction

ment and a mere license. In this case a town
granted a waterworks company a certain right of
way through its streets, and afterwards the officers

of the town agreed verbally to a change in route. The pipes
were laid in accordance with the change of route, and, after
more than six years of user, the owners of the property
through which the lines ran tore up the pipes, whereupon the
water company asked an injunction, claiming an easement in
the land. The court held that the company held but a mere
parol license, which was revocable though executed, and
though its revocation would 'cause the company great loss.
This is the generally accepted doctrine. See Laurence v.
SPinger,49 N. J. Eq. 289; Jones on Easements, § 70 f. The
rule that an executed license on which a party has acted is
irrevocable is adopted in many states-in Pennsylvania,
Resick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267; in Indiana, Robinson v.
Thrailkill, i i o Ind. I17 ; in Alabama, Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala.

578.
The question whether a mortgage covers, or rather how
far it covers, subsequently erected fixtures erected on the
Mortgage on

Fixtures,

What

Constitutes

mortgaged premises by the mortgagor, is one of

much importance, and one of its most interesting
variations is where the fixtures are erected by a
lessee of the mortgagor.

Beivin v. Raleigh Paper

Co., 31 S. E. (N. C.) 655, is a case of this class, with the not
unusual additional complication that, by a provision of the
lease, the fixtures were to remain the property of the lessee.
Following the modern thought (see Teaffv. Hewmitt, i Ohio
St. 5 1 I) that the intention of the parties is the main criterion,
the court held that such fixtures were not subject to the mortgage, either as against the lessee or his creditors who had
retained liens thereon. Montgomery, J., dissented.
SURETYSHIP.

The equitable right of contribution between cosureties is
subject to any equitable counterclaim, even though that coun-
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Contribution ter-claim might not amount to a set-off at law.

Equitable

Counter.
Claims

This is well illustrated when cosurety for pay-

ment of corporate note defends upon ground of
insolvency of maker and indebtedness of plaintiff
to it. While admitting this principle fully in Smith v. Dickinson, 76 N. W. (Wis.) 766, the court held it inapplicable because the defendant had proved that the corporation was insolvent only in the technical sense of not being able to pay
its debts as they matured, and not (as was necessary to his
case) that upon final accounting it would not be able to pay
all of its creditors.
WILLS.

In re Scowcraft [1898], 2 Ch. 638, decides that a gift by
the vicar of a. parish, by his will, to the vicar for the time
being of the parish, of a building to be used as a
Gift to
Charity,
Validity

village club and reading room, "to be maintained
for the furtherance of conservative principles and

religious and. mental improvement, and to be kept free from
intoxicants and dancing," was a good charitable gift. It was
argued that a gift for the furtherance of the political principles
of any one party was not for the benefit of the public generally, and was, therefore, not charitable. On the other side it
was said that a gift for religious purposes is good, and is not
vitiated by being intended to promote particular views: West
v. Shuttleworth, 2 M. & K. 684.
In the case of In re Hocking [1898], 2 Ch. 567, the Court
of Appeal has decided again that the legal possibility of childGift on
Failure of
sst,

Impossibility

bearing continues up to the moment of death.
There it appeared that A, by will, gave all his
property to trustees for the children of B and
C,

of

his sisters, to be equally divided amongst them on

Child-bearing the attainment of twenty-one years by the young-

est. And he further provided that should either of them
marry and die without children the property was all to go to
the other, and he gave his trustees power to make advancements to any child of any part of its prospective share, not
exceeding one-third thereof. B had children; C was fiftyfour years old and had no children. The trustees applied to
know whether the fact of C's being beyond the age of childbearing ended their discretion as to advancements under the
will. It was held that so long as C lived there was, in contemplation of law, a possibility of her having children, and the
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trustees' discretion was exercisable up to the time of her
death, at which time only the children of A would take a
vested interest in the property given to C's children, should
she have any. The court followed In re Lowman [1895]. z
Ch. 348 and In re Dawson, 39 Ch. D. i55. The case ofjee
v. Audley, I Cox, 324, was one dealing with the rule against
perpetuities. In that case it was held that a gift over on an
indefinite failure of issue of A and B, his wife, it being shown.
that A and B were both over seventy years old, was nevertheless bad as too remote, for the court refused to consider it
legally impossible for these two old persons to have issue.

